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 Abstract 
Based upon unique survey data collected using respondent driven sampling methods, we investigate 
whether there is a gender pay gap among social entrepreneurs in the UK. We find that women as 
social entrepreneurs earn 29% less than their male colleagues, above the average UK gender pay gap 
of 19%. We estimate the adjusted pay gap to be about 23% after controlling for a range of 
demographic, human capital and job characteristics, as well as personal preferences and values. These 
differences are hard to explain by discrimination since these CEOs set their own pay. Income may not 
be the only aim in an entrepreneurial career, so we also look at job satisfaction to proxy for non-
monetary returns. We find female social entrepreneurs to be more satisfied with their job as a CEO of 
a social enterprise than their male counterparts. This result holds even when we control for the salary 
generated through the social enterprise. Our results extend research in labour economics on the gender 
pay gap as well as entrepreneurship research on women’s entrepreneurship to the novel context of 
social enterprise. It provides the first evidence for a “contented female social entrepreneur” paradox. 
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1. Introduction: The Gender Pay Gap in Social Enterprises
Gender differences in pay are ubiquitous at all organisational levels including at the top 
(Arulampalam et al., 2007; Albrecht et al. 2003; Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Jurajda and 
Paligorova, 2009; Lalanne and Seabright, 2011; Pande and Ford, 2011; Palomino and Payrache, 
2010). However, there is recent US evidence that male-female wage gaps have been declining, 
see for example Beaudry and Lewis (2014). Entrepreneurship is hailed as one way for women to 
circumvent organizational norms and discrimination, because as CEOs of their own 
organizations, entrepreneurs largely determine their own pay. Moreover, social entrepreneurship 
may be a particularly gender-blind occupational choice; preliminary evidence indicates that 
women are more likely to start a social enterprise (e.g., Estrin et al., 2013). This opens the 
question of whether social entrepreneurship might be one occupation in which there is little or no 
gender pay gap. 
 Entrepreneurship is widely understood as playing an important role in job creation and 
economic growth (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Parker, 2009). Recently, socially motivated 
forms of entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, have come to prominence because of their 
promise of alleviating social problems such as poverty, discrimination or exclusion. Practitioners 
and researchers increasingly acknowledge the potential of entrepreneurship to create “social 
wealth” (Mair and Marti, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009). Commercial and social entrepreneurs have 
much in common, such as the central role of individual risk bearing and organisational formation 
but are distinguished by their objectives; profits and social wealth respectively. However, the 
literature as yet is largely descriptive (Teasdale et al., 2011; Terjersen et al., 2012) and there have 
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been few studies which analyse economic decisions in social enterprises, such as the 
determinants of the gender wage gap.  
Indeed few studies have explored gender differences in earnings amongst entrepreneurs in 
general.  Evidence from the US, Canada, Hungary and Norway (Berglann et al., 2011; Co et al., 
2005; Hundley, 2001; Karahan, 2013; Leung, 2006; Roche, 2013) points to a significant gender 
pay gap, which may be even greater amongst entrepreneurs compared to wage employment 
There is also a literature suggesting that income might not be the only outcome of an 
entrepreneurial career (Gorgievski et al., 2011; Van Praag and Versloot, 2008). Entrepreneurship 
and especially social entrepreneurship might permit people to make occupational choices which 
take account of non-monetary phenomena such as their desire for job flexibility. In particular, 
social entrepreneurs may reap benefits in terms of higher satisfaction from helping others 
through their enterprises (for related evidence see Cadsby et al., 2013; Grant, 2013; Grant and 
Sonnentag, 2010). Thus, we also investigate whether there is a gender gap in job satisfaction.   
If income and job satisfaction both enter individual utility functions positively, then one 
might expect a trade-off between the two in situations where individuals control the allocation of 
firm specific rents, such as in the leadership of entrepreneurial firms. Research about commercial 
entrepreneurs has identified the paradox of the “contented female business owner”, whereby 
female business owners are willing to trade-off pay for job satisfaction driven by different 
preferences for monetary versus non-monetary returns (Powell and Eddleston, 2008). But does 
this effect generalize to social entrepreneurship? Although non-monetary preferences play a 
significant role for  social entrepreneurs, the social enterprise has a hybrid nature, addressing 
social concerns through revenue-generating activities and thereby combining profit and social 
objectives (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Mair and Marti, 2006). Thus there may be a gender pay gap 
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because men and women are attracted to social enterprises for different reasons (Günther et al., 
2010). Evidence from related research on not-for-profit organizations supports this possibility; 
De Cooman et al. (2011) find that men and women working in not-for-profits demonstrate 
different motivational profiles.   
This is the first paper to look at the gender pay gap among social entrepreneurs. Our work is 
made possible by the collection of a unique dataset using respondent driven sampling methods to 
address the problem that there is as yet no information on the underlying population of social 
entrepreneurs (see also Bloom and Van Reenan, 2007). We use this dataset to identify whether 
gender pay and preference gaps exists, their scale and their determinants.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background and 
literature overview. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology of the paper. Section 
4 gives estimation results and robustness checks. Section 5 contains the discussion and 
conclusions. 
2. Background and Literature
We first discuss the literature on the gender pay gap for wage employment, top-level jobs and 
across different sectors before reviewing the scanty literature on the gender pay gap in 
commercial entrepreneurship. Finally we outline the main explanations of the gender pay gap 
and how they can be extended to social entrepreneurship.  
2.1 Evidence on the Gender Wage Gap 
The gender wage gap had remained more or less constant until the 1980s (based on 
mainly US data)  but has since been narrowing. Explanations have concentrated on improved 
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matching, positive selection and increased returns to education (Blau and Kahn, 1997, 2006; 
Lalanne and Seabright, 2011). For example, Goldin et al. (2010) explore the homecoming of 
American college women and the catch-up and reversal in the gender gap in college attendance 
and graduation in the period 1960-1980, which radically changed young women’s expectations 
of their future labour force participation. Despite these recent improvements in the labour market 
position of women the  gender pay gap remains large,  so women continue to earn considerably 
less than men on average; by 23% in the US (World Economic Forum, 2013); 19.1% in the UK; 
and 16% in the EU27 (European Union, 2014). According to Baudry and Lewis (2014), the 
average adjusted college-high school male-female wage gap has remained around 40% since 
1990, though the gender wage gap adjusted for education, experience, and ethnicity has declined 
from around 27 to 20% over the same period.  
The gender pay gap at the top of organisations (i.e. among top corporate positions) is 
even more pronounced than for employees as a whole (e.g., Pande and Ford, 2011). According to 
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) women represented about 2.5% of their sample of high-level US 
executives and earned about 45% less than men.3 Elkinawy and Stater (2011) find that the 
salaries of US female executives are about 5% lower than those of male executives, controlling 
for executive, firm, and board characteristics. 4  There are similar findings for Europe. 
Arulampalam et al. (2007) analysed gender pay gaps across the earnings distribution in eleven 
EU member countries, 1995-2001 and found that it widened at the top end of the distribution in 
all countries (the “glass ceiling” effect). Avlijaš et al. (2013) and Barón and Cobb-Clark (2008) 
report similar findings for the Western Balkans and Australia, respectively. Albrecht et al. (2003) 
3 Around 75% of this gap can be explained by the fact that women managed smaller companies and were less likely 
to be a CEO, a Chair, or a company President. 
4 The gender difference in salary is larger in firms with more male-dominated boards. Oaxaca wage decomposition 
suggests that greater female representation in the executive profession actually increases the gender differences 
caused by  unobserved factors, possibly due in part to governance structures that remain male-dominated. 
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show that the gender pay gap in Sweden is much higher at the top end of the wage distribution 
than at the bottom.  
Given the hybrid nature of social enterprise, research on the gender pay gap in not-for-
profits may also inform our study. It provides evidence for a significant gender pay gap including 
at the top of not-for-profit organisations. Deitrick et al. (2007) find that working in the not-for-
profit sector in the US contributes 1.9% to the overall gender pay gap of 27%. Decomposing the 
industry effect and comparing to all other industries suggests that not-for-profits contribute 6.3% 
(versus 2.3% of all other industries) to the 23.7% of the explained part of the gap. Analysing a 
sample of 114 directors of Small Business Development Centres (SBDCs),5 Gray and Benson 
(2003) find that when education, tenure, size, performance, and affiliation are held constant, 
female executives in not-for-profits are compensated significantly less than male executives. 
Similarly, Ban and Towers (2003) found a significant gender gap in wages of both executives 
and employees in not-for-profits in the Pittsburgh region.  
2.2 The Gender Wage Gap and Entrepreneurship 
There is almost no direct evidence about the gender wage gap at the top of entrepreneurial firms. 
The entrepreneurship literature primarily considers differences in the performance and earnings 
of new firms founded by males as against females, as well as differences in attitudes to risk 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2012). In their review, Jennings and Brush (2013) find that female-led 
enterprises tend to be smaller (as measured by employment, revenues, or asset base); grow less 
quickly; and generate lower levels of profit. However, they highlight that there is “some 
evidence to suggest that female-led firms perform similarly (or even better) than male-led firms 
5 The SBDCs are similar to non-profit organizations in that they are partially funded through various government 
grant programs and they must rely on matching funds and client fees for over half of their operating budgets. 
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on certain financial ratios and risk-adjusted measures” (Jennings and Brush, 2013). Using self-
employment as an indicator of entrepreneurship, they also conclude that women tend to earn less 
income than men.6 Studies by Hundley (2000, 2001) suggest that the gender gap in the earnings 
of the self-employed can be attributed to the specialisation of the genders in housework vs. 
market work. “…. self-employed women’s earnings declined with marriage, family size, and 
hours of housework, whereas self-employed men’s earnings increased with marriage and family 
size.” (Hundley, 2000). Hundley (2001) also finds that personal characteristics (with the 
exception of tenure in the business) and business capital (assets) play only a small role in 
explaining the gender wage gap. Business characteristics, especially sector, explain a significant 
share of the gender wage gap, as does the distribution of labour between household and market 
work. Finally, Roche (2013) studies different returns to education for self-employed men vs. 
women with respect to earnings from self-employment. She reports the returns to be large for 
men but heterogeneous for women (e.g., dependent on industry) – a finding mirrored in 
Karahan’s (2013) analysis of educated Americans in the 1990’s.7  
2.3 Potential drivers of the gender pay gap among social entrepreneurs 
Four possible explanations for the gender pay gap amongst entrepreneurs have been proposed 
(Parker, 2009): human capital, preferences, social capital, and start-up capital. In this paper we 
concentrate on the former two explanations. We follow the literature in distinguishing between 
differences due to observable characteristics, such as human capital and preferences, (explained 
6 Haber et al. (1987) found that the ratio of income of fully self-employed females relative to males in the US was 
only 0.3, even lower than the ratio in employment of 0.6. Hundley (2001) notes that women often engage in part-
time self-employment; hence the gender pay/earnings gap is significantly smaller (a ratio of 1.16 vs. 2.33) for hourly 
as opposed to annual earnings. Roche (2013) based on 2008/2009 US data estimates the mean gender earnings gap 
in self-employment to be 55% for annual earnings (compared to a gender gap of 75% for wage employment) and 
72% for hourly earnings (similar to the gender gap in wage employment).  
7 Van der Sluis et al. (2008) conduct a statistical review (meta-analyses) of the empirical evidence (in developed 
economies) on returns to education for entrepreneurs. Although gender differences are not the focus of their analysis 
they report a generally higher link between education and performance for female as opposed to male entrepreneurs.  
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part of the wage gap) and differences due to labour market discrimination (unexplained or 
adjusted part of the wage gap).8  
The human capital approach explains the gender wage gap by differences in observable 
characteristics and personal endowments or constraints proxied by variables such as age, years of 
education, work experience and number of working hours. Blau and Kahn (2007) show that there 
has been a substantial increase in women’s relative earnings since the 1970s. This gain was 
initially concentrated on younger women, but now women of all ages have narrowed the pay 
gap. Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) analysis suggests that a substantial fraction of the closing of 
the gender wage gap can be explained by changes in the nature of jobs for women. Using data 
from West Germany, they find that women have witnessed relative increases in non-routine 
analytic and interactive tasks driven, at least in part, by technological change. In their life-cycle 
theory of the gender wage gap, Manning and Swaffield (2008) suggest that male-female wage 
differences will become amplified within a cohort over time because women may drop out of the 
labour force for a period to raise children and because more women work part-time. Therefore 
labour market experience accumulates more slowly for women than men. Even so, the authors 
show that a substantial unexplained gap remains: women who have continuous full-time 
employment, have had no children and have expressed no desire to have children still earn about 
8 log points less than equivalent men after 10 years in the labour market.  
 In the entrepreneurship context, these arguments suggest that female entrepreneurs may 
not experience the same returns from their ventures as men, because they may not put in the 
same level of effort or because they have accumulated less human capital (e.g. Greene et al., 
8  The economic theory of discrimination goes back to Becker (1957), where he distinguished three types of 
discrimination: (1) employer discrimination; (2) customer discrimination; and (3) co-worker discrimination.  
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2003). The entrepreneurship studies reviewed above point to the relevance of effort-based 
explanations, especially that women’s housework and childcare responsibilities constrain their 
pay (e.g., Hundley, 2001), as well as human capital explanations (e.g. Co et al., 2005). They also 
suggest that experience and tenure in the business help to explain the gender gap (e.g., Co et al., 
2005; Powell and Eddleston, 2008).  Thus we may find a gender pay gap in social enterprises 
because male and female social entrepreneurs differ in terms of their human capital and labour 
input constraints. We therefore include human capital variables such as age, education and 
effort-based variables such as hours worked on the social enterprise per week in our estimations.  
Differences in preferences may also be relevant in explaining a social enterprise gender 
pay gap. According to Carter et al. (2003), financial motives are more important for male than 
female entrepreneurs. Buttner and Moore (1997) found that the achievement of personal goals 
(e.g., autonomy, flexibility) and self-fulfilment are more important objectives for female 
entrepreneurs than profits for male entrepreneurs. Buchan et al. (2008) find differences in trust 
between the genders in the Investment Game. In their review, Jennings and Brush (2013) 
underscore that differences in preferences about monetary and non-monetary goals between male 
and female entrepreneurs need to be acknowledged. These are consistent with research on gender 
differences in preferences more generally. For example, Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz (2009) 
find that men show stronger self-interest preferences, including the importance attributed to 
money, than women. Similarly, economic experiments reveal gender preferences in self- vs. 
other-interest (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  
The degree of risk aversion may be another area where preferences differ by gender 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Bearing risk and uncertainty is a key element of entrepreneurship 
because of the need to experiment and innovate to keep up with and outperform the market. 
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Evidence suggests that women entrepreneurs are more risk averse than men, as for instance 
indicated by the higher variability in earnings for male as opposed to female entrepreneurs.  For 
instance, Parrotta and Smith (2013) find evidence of greater risk aversion among female CEOs in 
Denmark. Croson and Gneezy (2009) identify striking general gender difference in risk 
preferences with women being more risk averse than men. Indeed, Gneezy et al. (2003) explain 
the gender wage gap by arguing that women behave differently in competitive environments, 
including the labour market, and earn less than men as a result. 
Thus, a gender pay gap may arise in part because male and female social entrepreneurs 
have different preferences for money, pay and risk. This possibility leads us to control for 
personal preferences for risk and innovation, as well as for self-interest (self-enhancement 
values) in our explanation of earning differences.  
2.4 A Gender Gap in Job Satisfaction? 
Despite  their lower pay, women are not necessarily dissatisfied with their jobs;  the so-
called “contented female worker paradox” (e.g., Davison, 2014). Entrepreneurs’ job satisfaction 
has been found to be higher than that of wage employees (e.g., Bradley and Roberts, 2004), but 
there has been little attention to gender differences.  However, Powell and Eddleston, (2008) 
investigate entrepreneurs’ firm performance (rather than their personal income) using a broad 
measure of satisfaction with business success; they conclude that there is a “paradox of the 
contented female business owner”. This is not due to differential effort or human capital, but 
rather that female business owners valued business success less. Indeed their satisfaction with 
business success was independent of their business’ actual level of sales. (More about personal 
values theory and empirics can be found in Appendix 1 of this paper.) 
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It is not clear how gender differences in preferences will play out for  social 
entrepreneurs. Although monetary preferences may be less central for some social entrepreneurs, 
the hybrid nature of the social enterprise allows for both to be fulfilled simultaneously. This 
raises the possibility that women and men are attracted to social enterprise for different reasons; 
“doing good” or “doing well and doing good”. Evidence from related research on not-for-profit 
organizations supports this possibility; De Cooman et al. (2011) find that men and women 
working in not-for-profits demonstrate different motivational profiles.  
In sum, the relevant literature points to explaining both earnings and job satisfaction  by 
indicators of the CEOs human capital (education), demographic characteristics (gender and age), 
personal preferences for risk, innovation, and self-enhancement values, as well as job and social 
enterprise characteristics. The latter include effort-based variables such as hours worked, 
whether the CEO is the founder of the social enterprise; whether social entrepreneurship is the 
only job; and the sector of the firm. Our model is summarised in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Model of the determinants of income and job satisfaction by gender 
3. Data Description and Methodology
3.1 SELUSI Data 
This is the first study to use a relatively large random sample survey about social entrepreneurs; 
comprising 159 social entrepreneurs in the United Kingdom in 2011. From the second wave of 
the SELUSI data9 . Information on the social enterprises and their CEOs was collected by 
combining a structured phone interview with an online survey. Social enterprise CEOs were 
defined as those leading an organization with a social mission (social criterion) which generated 
a minimum of 5% of its revenues by selling products or services in the market (entrepreneurial 
criterion). The organization also had to employ at least one (full-time equivalent) employee to 
exclude self-employment and volunteer-only organisations. In line with the literature that social 
9 The full dataset is a two-period unbalanced panel of over 500 social enterprises in Hungary, Romania, Spain, and 
the UK. 
Job and social enterprise characteristics 
‐ Number of hours per week working for the social enterprise 
‐ Founder or one of the founders of the social enterprise  
‐ Whether social entrepreneurship is the only job  
‐ Industry sector  
Dependent 
variables:  
Net income (salary) 
of CEO 
entrepreneur 
(economic returns 
from social 
entrepreneurship) 
 Job satisfaction 
(non-economic 
returns from social 
entrepreneurship) 
Preferences 
‐ Risk preferences  
‐ Innovation preferences 
‐ Self-enhancement values (self-interest preferences)
Human capital (personal endowments/constraints and 
observable demographic characteristics) 
‐ Gender 
‐ Age and age squared (proxy for work experience) 
‐ Education 
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enterprise is a hybrid form of organization (Mair and Marti, 2006), our sample includes 
‘entrepreneurial’, revenue-generating not-for-profits, as well as for-profit enterprises with a 
social mission. To circumvent self-reporting bias, social mission characteristics were rated by 
interviewers based on a set of questions eliciting the entrepreneur’s description of their enterprise 
mission.10 
There were two challenges in identifying our sample of social entrepreneurs. First, there 
is no exhaustive list or registry of social enterprises in any European country to provide a 
population as a basis for random sampling, and second, relative to a country’s adult population, 
social entrepreneurs are rare. For instance, a cross-country population-representative survey 
focussed on entrepreneurship, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (www.gemconsortium.org/), 
found that on average only 2.8% of adults were social entrepreneurs across 49 countries 
(Terjesen et al., 2012). These constraints led us to the use of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) 
(Heckathorn, 1997, 2002; Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004). The RDS combines “snowball” or 
“network-based” sampling (respondents refer those they know, who in turn refer those they 
know, and so on) with a model of the sample recruitment process which allocates weights to 
compensate for the fact that the sample was collected in a non-random way. Using this method, 
statistically representative samples of relatively small and groups for which no reliable list of 
population members is available can be generated. The RDS has been applied to other hard-to-
10 In assessing the social mission we followed validated interview and coding protocols established in economics 
(van Reenen and Bloom, 2007), psychology (Baum, Locke and Kirckpatrick, 1998) and management (Palmer and 
Short, 2008). In our study, extensively trained interviewers coded the enterprise mission. In particular, during the 
phone interviews, interviewers posed an open-ended question to social entrepreneurs “How would you summarize 
the rationale or purpose of being of your organization, i.e. its mission?”, they were instructed to note down the 
answer to this question verbatim and the entire interview was also recorded. Interviewers were trained to apply a 
number of follow-up questions to ensure that the mission was proved in sufficient depth. With regard to coding the 
social mission in our study, we used a five-point coding scale from none to high social mission where both the 
extremes and the middle-points were defined (as in van Reenen and Bloom, 2007, Baum et al., 1998). Interviewers 
were extensively trained in how to employ the question and coding scale using a range of different organisational 
missions. The training also included in-depth discussions of examples of social enterprises whose mission 
represented the different scale points.  
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reach populations such as: drug injectors, prostitutes, gay men, street youth, homeless people, as 
well as jazz musicians and other artists. Studies show that the RDS leads to representative 
samples equivalent to large poll surveys (Heckathorn, 2002). 
In order to identify a nationally representative sample of social entrepreneurs, we 
therefore first identified a set of so-called seed social entrepreneurs, diversified across industry 
sector, geographical distribution, age of organisation, company size, source of information from 
which the contact of the seed enterprise was obtained. Each interviewed seed social entrepreneur 
was then asked to nominate three peers from their network, whom we subsequently contacted 
and asked for three further referrals. The peer recruitment represents the network-based sampling 
approach. Heckathorn (1997, 2002) shows that if referral chains are long enough (4-5 waves), 
the characteristics of the seeds have no significant impact on ultimate sample composition.  
3.2 Estimation strategy 
Our estimation strategy involved several steps. First, to implement our model (see Figure 1), we 
estimate a human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974) which relates the log of net annual 
salary (income) from a social enterprise to gender, age, observed measures of schooling, and 
other labour market characteristics, with a specification that is linear in education and quadratic 
in age to proxy for the diminishing role of work experience: 
y୧ ൌ lnሺ ௜ܻሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܩ௜ ൅ ߛଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߛଶܣ݃݁௜ ൅ ߛଷܣ݃݁௜ଶ ൅ ࢄ௜′ࢽ௞ ൅ ߝ௜ ,   (1) 
where 
௜ܻ ൌ individual net annual salary (income) from a social enterprise; y୧  = log 
transformation. 
ܩ௜	= gender dummy variable (= 1 if female; = 0 otherwise). 
௜ܵ 	= education level, categorized into four levels (0 = other; 1 = high school; 2 = 
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professional/vocational degree; 3 = bachelor’s degree). 
ܣ݃݁௜ ൌ age in years. 
ܣ݃݁௜ଶ ൌ age in years, squared. 
ࢄ௜′ 	= vector of other labour market characteristics, such as job and social 
enterprise characteristics, preferences, and values (see Figure 1).  
ߚ ൏ 0 the average difference in log individual net annual salary (income) from a 
social enterprise between females and males, given the same labour market 
characteristics (and the same error term ߝ௜); measures the change in wages 
when comparing, ceteris paribus, an average female to an average male; if 
ߚ ൏ 0, then for the same level of other factors, women earn less than men 
on average; expressed in percentages, women earn 100 ∗ ሾexpሺߚሻ െ 1ሿ less 
than men. 
ߛଵ ൐ 0 the movement from one educational level to another produces 100 ∗
ሾexpሺߛଵሻ െ 1ሿ	percent change in lnሺ ௜ܻሻ; rate of return to schooling. 
ߛଶ ൐ 0 
ߛଷ ൏ 0 
estimates the rate of growth in earnings resulting from one additional year 
of labour market experience; rate of return to experience. 
ࢽ௞ ൌ measures the effect of other labour market characteristics in the model. 
݅, ݇ ݅ is index for a sample size (݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ); ݇ (݇ ൌ 1,… , ܭ); is index for a 
total number of explanatory variables included in the Mincer regression 
model. 
Second, in order to test whether the coefficients on samples of male and female social 
entrepreneurs are equal, we estimated a model where the intercept and all slopes in the final 
earnings regression specification were allowed to differ across the two groups (the Chow test; 
Chow, 1960), and subsequently estimate equation (1) separately for male and female social 
entrepreneurs in order to capture the differences in the coefficients across the two groups. Third, 
we go on to estimate the probit regressions using job satisfaction as a dependent variable, with 
the vector of independent variables as outlined in Figure 1, and with and without net annual 
salary from a social enterprise included in the list of covariates. Fourth, in order to test whether 
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log salary and job satisfaction regression models are jointly determined, we further estimate 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), which assumes that the error terms are correlated across 
the two equations.  
Finally, we perform a set of robustness checks including using imputed salary from a social 
enterprise as a dependent variable, where the missing observations are imputed by the variable 
mean and by observed values from the first wave of SELUSI data. We also perform robustness 
checks by using the log of the current (in 2010-2011) revenues instead of social entrepreneur 
annual income as a dependent variable.  
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The definitions of all the variables included in the final earnings regression specification of 
equation 1 is given in Table 1, with summary statistics reported in Table 2, correlation 
coefficients in Table 3, and mean male-female comparisons in Table 4. The unadjusted gender 
pay gap (GPG) is the difference between the average income earned by women and men, i.e., a 
difference between the income of an ‘average’ working woman and an ‘average’ working man in 
a given population. The data in Table 4 show the unadjusted gender pay gap in net annual salary 
(income) from the social enterprise to be 29%. This does not take into account the differences in 
labour market characteristics between male and female social entrepreneurs which we establish 
below. Table 4 reveals no significant gender differences in social entrepreneurs’ job satisfaction. 
In terms of revenues, there is 88% gender difference in social enterprises, to the disadvantage of 
females. Men set up their social enterprise more often in the sector of business activities and 
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business services (14% higher frequency), whereas women in the sample set up their social 
enterprise more often in the social services sector (including education, health and social work 
and other community and social services). There are no other statistically significant differences 
between male and female social entrepreneurs. 
4.2 Regression Analysis – Dependent Variable: Log-Salary 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (1) , where the dependent variable is log of 
net annual salary. It contains seven specifications: in column (1) only gender is included as an 
explanatory variable; in column (2) the specification is extended with variables accounting for 
work experience (age and age squared)) and education (human capital); in column (3) effort is 
added, proxied by the log of the number of hours per week); in column (4) the specification is 
extended to include managerial job characteristics (whether a CEO was a founder or one of the 
founders of a social enterprise and whether this was his/her only paid for job); in column (5) 
controls for industry are added; in column (6) the regression is extended with an indicator for 
personal preferences (risk and innovation); in column (7) self-enhancement values are added to 
the regression, capturing individualistic preferences, such as preferences for pay.11  
The coefficient of gender in Table 5, column (1) measures the unadjusted gender pay 
gap, representing 29% lower net annual salary for female social entrepreneurs. When we include 
11 Controlling for job satisfaction did not produce significant results in any of the specifications; hence it was 
dropped from the regression. Being the owner of a social enterprise is highly correlated with whether a CEO was a 
founder or one of the founders of a social enterprise (correlation coefficient of 0.53); the joint inclusion of the two 
variables did not add additional explanatory power to the regression. The number of years that a person was a 
director or a CEO of a social organization (tenure) was also not significant. Only industry sector of the main 
organisation activity (e.g., activity which earns most revenue; for which most people are employed; which creates 
biggest social impact) is kept in the regression, due to a small sample size on other industry-sector related variables. 
Age of the organization, current revenues, and number of employees are all highly correlated with each other and 
with the net annual salary from a social enterprise (correlation coefficients between 0.60 and 0.90; all proxy the size 
of the organisation); they were not included in a regression due to the potential multicollinearity problems. 
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the proxies for work experience and human capital, the estimated gender pay gap is reduced to 
25%. Adding the remaining explanatory variables (Table 5, specifications (3) to (7)), reduces the 
adjusted (unexplained) gender pay gap to 23%. We can conclude that taking into account the 
differences in labour market characteristics and personal preferences and values between male 
and female social entrepreneurs explains about 6% of the observed gender difference in net 
annual salary; the remaining 23% of the pay gap is unexplained. This exists because of either (i) 
labour market discrimination against women (“labour market frictions”), or (ii) heterogeneity of 
social entrepreneurs’ characteristics, which we were not able to capture through variables such as 
age, education, hours of work, other job and social enterprise characteristics, personal 
preferences and values. 
Since working in the business activities and business services sectors significantly 
contributes to higher pay, yet more men than women set up their social enterprise in this sector 
(14% higher frequency), it might be argued that women self-select into lower-paid sectors of the 
economy. It has been documented that female-dominated sectors (and occupations) offer lower 
salary irrespective of skill-requirements and other wage-relevant factors, (Bayard and 
Hellerstein, 2003; Boraas and Rodgers III, 2003; Petersen and Saporta, 2004). We therefore 
segment the sample by gender to explore this issue. 
4.2.1. Splitting the Sample across Gender (Chow Test) 
We estimate a model where the intercept and all slopes in specification (7) in Table 5 
were allowed to differ across the two groups; male and female social entrepreneurs (Wooldridge, 
2009, Chapter 7). The Chow F-test of joint significance of gender plus all gender-interactions is 
significant at 1% level (the Chow test statistic is F(13,  87) = 2.56; p-value = 0.005), see Table 6. 
Based on this, we continue under the premise that male and female social entrepreneurs are 
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described by different wage offer models. Separate estimates of equation (1) for male and female 
social entrepreneurs are reported in Table 7. 
Regression results in Table 7 show that the main factors explaining the net annual salary of 
male social entrepreneurs (positive effect) are education level, number of hours per week 
working for a social enterprise, and working in the sector of business activities and business 
services. For female social entrepreneurs, the main factor explaining the net annual salary from a 
social enterprise (positive effect) is the personal preference for innovation. This finding appears 
to be consistent with prior findings in so far as returns to education for women are less consistent 
than for men (e.g., Roche, 2013), and that men tend to work in higher-paying sectors . The 
previous effects together with the positive effect of innovation preferences for female social 
entrepreneurs may reflect the fact that women and men chose to engage in social 
entrepreneurship for different reasons. Women out of a desire to ‘do good’ which is arguably 
possible in a more innovative manner in social enterprises as compared to more traditional social 
sector work (in public services or traditional not-for-profits); and men out of a desire to combine 
‘doing good and doing well’.  
4.3 Regression Analysis – Dependent Variable: Job Satisfaction 
With regard to our second dependent variable, job satisfaction, we estimate probit regressions 
using as explanatory variables the vector of variables specified in Table 5, column (7), with and 
without net annual salary included in the list of covariates. In Tables 8, columns (1) and (2) refer 
to specifications without and with salary respectively. The effect of gender on job satisfaction is 
positive and significant in both specifications. When salary is included into the regression, the 
effect of gender on job satisfaction is even larger, though the coefficient of salary itself is not 
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significant. Female social entrepreneurs are between 14% and 17% (columns (10 versus (2)) 
more likely to be satisfied with their job as a CEO of a social enterprise than male social 
entrepreneurs. Other factors that contribute significantly to job satisfaction of social 
entrepreneurs are age and whether a social entrepreneur is a founder or one of the founders of a 
social enterprise. The age effect is consistent with the wider literature on workers’ attitudes, 
where older workers are consistently found to be more satisfied with their jobs as they become 
more focussed on the positive aspects of their jobs (e.g., Ng and Feldman, 2010). The effect of 
being the founder may be due to a similar mechanism, where the level of personal investment in 
the enterprise (greater if one is the founder) leads to a positive bias emphasizing the positive 
aspects of the job.  
4.3.1 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) 
In order to test whether the salary and job satisfaction regression models are jointly 
determined, we estimated seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system, which assumes that the 
error terms are correlated across the two equations. Since the SUR model assumes that the two 
regressions are linear, we estimate the linear probability model (LPM) of job satisfaction instead 
of a probit regression. Estimation results are shown in Table 9. Columns (1) and (2) show joint 
estimation of the two regressions, whereas columns (3) to (5) estimate separate regressions. 
Column (3) is identical to our log-salary estimation results (Table 5, column (7)), whereas 
columns (4) and (5) estimate the LPM regressions of job satisfaction, without and with salary 
from a social enterprise included in a regression. Joint estimation of log salary and job 
satisfaction regressions (SUR) does not show significantly different regression coefficients, 
standard errors, R-squared measures, etc., from those in the separate regressions. Therefore, we 
conclude that the error terms are not correlated across the two equations. The findings in this 
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section seem to confirm the “paradox of the contented female (social) business owner,” whereby 
the female social entrepreneur job satisfaction is independent of the salary generated through the 
social business, whilst female social entrepreneurs job satisfaction is simultaneously higher and 
pay lower compared to male social entrepreneurs.  
4.4 Robustness Checks 
4.4.1 Estimation Results with Imputed Salary 
Reported in Appendix 2 are robustness checks of the base estimation presented in Table 5 this 
time using net annual salary with missing observations imputed with the sample variable mean 
(19 observations imputed; Table A5a) and imputed with the values from the first wave of the 
SELUSI data (2009-2010) and the sample variable mean (19 observations imputed; Table A5b). 
These estimation results corroborate our findings in Table 5: including the full set of explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side (RHS) of the regression (Tables A5a and A5b, specifications (2) 
to (7)) reduces the estimated gender pay gap from 27% (unadjusted income gap) to 21% 
(adjusted or unexplained income gap).  
4.4.2 Estimation Results with Log-Revenues as a Dependent Variable 
We further perform robustness checks using the log of the current (in 2010-2011) revenues 
instead of social entrepreneur annual income as the dependent variable. For six companies in the 
sample, missing observations are imputed with information from official company reports in 
2009 and 2010 taken from the ORBIS database (https://orbis.bvdinfo.com/). Estimation results 
are presented in Appendix 2 Table A5c. Including the full set of explanatory variables keeps the 
estimated gender gap in organization revenues (proxy for the size of organisation) at the level of 
22 
the unadjusted revenue gap (88%). Our analysis suggests that male social entrepreneurs run 
larger businesses than female social entrepreneurs, even when we control for measurable 
characteristics such as age, education, hours of work, other job and social enterprise 
characteristics, personal preferences and values. This corroborates findings from the commercial 
entrepreneurship literature whereby female-led firms tend to be smaller in size than male-led 
enterprises, measured by employment, revenues or asset base (Jennings and Brush, 2013). Other 
factors which significantly contribute to higher organization revenues are number of hours per 
week working for the social enterprise and whether social entrepreneurship is the entrepreneurs’ 
only paid job. 
Although we cannot show this directly in our analysis due to the high correlation between net 
annual income and organisation revenues (0.68), the size of a social enterprise might be the main 
explanatory variable for the unexplained gender pay gap in our sample (23%), since by and large 
entrepreneurs set their own pay. We can therefore rule out labour market frictions as an 
explanation of the unexplained gender pay gap, as it does not seem very likely that female social 
entrepreneurs would discriminate against themselves by reducing their own income. The 
equations suggest that female social entrepreneurs may pay themselves a salary depending on 
their firm’s characteristics and performance.   
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Using unique and novel survey data on social enterprises, we investigate whether there is a 
gender pay gap among social entrepreneurs in the UK. We show that even as social 
entrepreneurs, women earn 29% less than their male colleagues; a greater unadjusted gap than 
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the UK average of 19%. Controlling for demographic, human capital, job, social business, 
personal preference and values characteristics, we estimate an adjusted pay gap of about 23%.  
We suggest that the size and performance of the social enterprise is probably the main 
explanatory variable for this adjusted (unexplained) gender pay gap, although we cannot show 
this directly because of the high correlation between net annual income and organisation 
revenues (0.68). The mechanism that we propose is the following: female social entrepreneurs 
set up their own social enterprise and pay themselves a salary determined by its characteristics 
and performance, for example size, growth, and profit. The characteristics of the enterprise are 
determined by their personal traits and preferences for risk, innovation, and preference for self- 
as opposed to other-interest. For example, if women are more risk averse, have less access to 
sources of finances, set up their enterprise in lower-paid sectors of the economy, and are more 
innovative and prosocial, these traits and preferences will determine the size and the performance 
of the social enterprise that they run,  and subsequently determine the salary that they can pay 
themselves. 
We have noted that job satisfaction might also be an important variable, capturing non-
monetary returns to a career in social entrepreneurship. Our data suggest that female social 
entrepreneurs are more satisfied with their job than their male counterparts, even when we 
control for their lower salary. Our findings therefore are consistent with the “paradox of the 
contented female (social) business owner,” whereby the female social entrepreneur job 
satisfaction is independent of the salary generated through the social business.  
Our findings have interesting implications for policy makers. There are numerous reasons 
to support social entrepreneurship, including the promise of social enterprise as a vehicle to 
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address pressing social issues which governments no longer have the resources to deal with. 
There are also the documented positive spill-over effects of social on commercial 
entrepreneurship. Social enterprise appears to be a route into commercial entrepreneurship 
attracting those who are typically less likely to engage in commercial entrepreneurship and who 
through the social enterprise experience build skills and confidence that they subsequently 
leverage for commercial entrepreneurship (Estrin et al. 2013). However, the results of this study 
contribute to a more rounded perspective, highlighting that although social enterprise is a highly 
satisfying occupational choice, it also perpetuates gender pay inequalities. What is not clear is 
whether this should be of concern to policy makers, if the pay gap is not driven by discrimination 
but rather by choices of the social entrepreneurs themselves. Since society in general will likely 
always be concerned by income inequalities, whether explicable by social and economic factors 
or not, policy makers might wish to engage business support and communication campaigns to 
mitigate the pay gap while stressing personal fulfilment.      
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable description 
Dependent variable (log salary) 
salarownGBP Net annual salary/income from a social enterprise (in GBP) 
lsalarownGBP Log net annual salary/income from a social enterprise (in GBP) 
lsalarownGBP1 Log net annual salary/income from a social enterprise (in GBP); missing observations imputed by the variable mean 
(19 observations imputed) 
lsalarownGBP2 Log net annual salary/income from a social enterprise (in GBP); missing observations imputed by the values from 
the first wave of SELUSI data (5 observations imputed) 
lsalarownGBP3 Log net annual salary/income from a social enterprise (in GBP); missing observations imputed by the values from 
the first wave of SELUSI data and the variable mean (19 observations imputed) 
Dependent variable (job satisfaction) 
jsatisfn1 Job satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 4 (original scale 1-7, recoded as 4=1 5=2 6=3 7=4, because there was no  
respondents who provided answers from 1 to 3; reference data from World Value Survey (WVS) or European Social 
Survey (ESS)) 
jsatisfn2 Job satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 1 
0 = satisfied (answers 4 and 5 on jsatisfn1) 
1 = very satisfied (answers 6 and 7 on jsatisfn1) 
ljsatisfn1 Log job satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 4 
Personal characteristics and human capital
gender 0 = male
1 = female 
age_er Age of the social entrepreneur (in years) 
age_er2 Age squared 
educorr Education level
0 = other 
1 = High school  
2 = Professional/vocational degree  
3 = Bachelor's degree        
4 = MBA + Master degree  
5 = Doctorate 
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Managerial job characteristics  
lhrsrealn Number of hours per week working for a social enterprise; 
Variable is coded in intervals, e.g. 76-80 hours; we take the middle of the interval and then create log 
founderr_dum Are you a founder or one of the founders of a social enterprise? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
jobonlyn Is this your only paid for job? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
Social business characteristics 
act1nace2i1 Industry sector, broad categories; for 2 companies, missing observations imputed by information from ORBIS 
1 = Industry + agriculture 
2 = Trade, gastronomy, transport and telecommunication 
3 = Business activities and business services 
4 = Education + Health and social work + Other community and social services 
revnow What are the current (2010-2011) revenues for your organization (in GBP)? Proxy for the size of the organisation 
lrevnow Log of the current revenues 
revnowi1 What are the current (2010-2011) revenues for your organization (in GBP)? Proxy for the size of the organisation. 
For six companies in the sample, missing observations are imputed with information from ORBIS in 2009 & 2010. 
lrevnowi1 Log of the current revenues (imputed variable) 
Personality traits measures 
risk Measured on a scale from 0 to 4, where 4 means more risk prone. 
innovative Measured on a scale from 1 to 5: 
1 = Not at all true 
3 = Neither/nor 
5 = Absolutely true 
Values measures 
SEnhan_lo Self-enhancement: measure of self-interest preferences (see Appendix 1 for details) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation
salarownGBP 140 40,988.930 20,201.560
lsalarownGBP 140 10.485 0.571
lsalarownGBP1 159 10.485 0.536
lsalarownGBP2 145 10.486 0.584
lsalarownGBP3 159 10.486 0.558
jsatisfn1 131 3.038 0.854
jsatisfn2 131 0.733 0.444
ljsatisfn1 131 1.063 0.334
gender 133 0.361 0.482
age_er 133 49.406 9.607
age_er2 133 2,532.549 935.284
educorr 133 3.008 1.145
lhrsrealn 134 3.711 0.500
founderr_dum 134 0.575 0.496
jobonlyn 133 0.744 0.438
act1nace2i1 (category 1) 154 0.156 0.364
act1nace2i1 (category 2) 154 0.123 0.330
act1nace2i1 (category 3) 154 0.351 0.479
act1nace2i1 (category 4) 154 0.370 0.484
revnow 149 2,476,775.000 7,141,769.000
lrevnow 149 13.176 1.680
revnowi1 155 2,394,937.000 7,013,368.000
lrevnowi1 155 13.149 1.662
risk 131 2.053 1.152
innovative 131 4.234 0.596
SEnhan_lo 131 3.528 0.872
Note: For variable description, see Table 1.  
The actual sample size in any particular regression depends on the maximum number 
of observed data points of the variables included in that regression. The final  
specification includes 113 observations. 
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
gender (1) 1.00 
lsalarownGBP (2) -0.27 1.00 
jsatisfn2 (3) 0.16 0.12 1.00 
age_er (4) -0.13 0.35 0.25 1.00 
age_er2 (5) -0.13 0.32 0.22 0.99 1.00 
educorr (6) -0.09 0.21 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
lhrsrealn (7) -0.13 0.25 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.10 1.00 
founderr_dum (8) 0.18 -0.25 0.15 0.08 0.10 -0.14 -0.03 1.00 
jobonlyn (9) 0.02 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.12 -0.21 0.40 -0.23 1.00 
act1nace2i1 (cat 1) (10) 0.02 -0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 -0.21 0.00 0.05 0.10 1.00 
act1nace2i1 (cat 2) (11) -0.10 -0.24 -0.18 -0.21 -0.18 0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.20 -0.16 1.00 
act1nace2i1 (cat 3) (12) -0.11 0.24 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.29 -0.22 1.00 
act1nace2i1 (cat 4) (13) 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.15 -0.04 0.05 -0.40 -0.30 -0.56 1.00 
lrevnowi1 (14) -0.34 0.68 0.06 0.25 0.23 0.07 0.27 -0.19 0.19 -0.10 -0.17 0.13 0.06 1.00 
risk-taking (15) -0.03 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.18 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.15 0.03 -0.17 0.03 0.09 1.00 
innovative (16) 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.11 -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.15 0.08 0.10 1.00 
SEnhan_lo (17) -0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.15 -0.15 0.23 0.06 0.12 -0.16 -0.09 -0.13 -0.02 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.22 1.00 
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Table 4. Statistical differences of means of earnings and life satisfaction across gender 
Male Female Significance
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Difference t-test p-value
salarownGBP 71 47,000.00 46 35,000.00 12,000.00 3.093 0.002 *** 
lsalarownGBP 71 10.61 46 10.32 0.29 2.694 0.008 ***
jsatisfn1 83 2.95 48 3.19 -0.24 -1.53 0.129
jsatisfn2 83 0.69 48 0.81 -0.13 -1.57 0.119
ljsatisfn1 83 1.03 48 1.11 -0.08 -1.33 0.186
age_er 85 50.18 48 48.04 2.13 1.233 0.220
age_er2 85 2,609.00 48 2,397.17 211.83 1.257 0.211
educorr 85 3.06 48 2.92 0.14 0.686 0.494
lhrsrealn 85 3.72 48 3.72 0.00 -0.037 0.971
founderr_dum 85 0.54 48 0.63 -0.08 -0.934 0.352
jobonlyn 85 0.72 48 0.79 -0.07 -0.936 0.351
act1nace2i1 (category 1) 83 0.16 48 0.17 -0.01 -0.150 0.881
act1nace2i1 (category 2) 83 0.13 48 0.08 0.05 0.848 0.398
act1nace2i1 (category 3) 83 0.37 48 0.23 0.14 1.711 0.089 *
act1nace2i1 (category 4) 83 0.34 48 0.52 -0.18 -2.080 0.040 **
revnowi1 85 3,400,000.00 45 1,300,000.00 2,100,000.00 1.466 0.145
lrevnowi1 85 13.48 45 12.60 0.88 2.766 0.007 ***
risk-taking 83 2.04 48 2.08 -0.05 -0.225 0.822
innovative 83 4.22 48 4.26 -0.04 -0.421 0.675
SEnhan_lo 83 3.59 48 3.43 0.16 0.98 0.328
Note: The mean difference statistically significant at *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1) significance level. 
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Table 5. Dependent variable log salary: Specifications 1-7 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5 OLS6 OLS7 
gender -0.293*** -0.246** -0.219** -0.211** -0.226** -0.235** -0.225** 
(0.109) (0.098) (0.097) (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
age_er 0.159*** 0.155*** 0.124*** 0.110** 0.109** 0.110** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
age_er2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
educorr 0.098** 0.089** 0.098** 0.099** 0.065 0.058 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) 
lhrsrealn 0.282** 0.186 0.175 0.183 0.167 
(0.125) (0.137) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) 
founderr_dum -0.177* -0.166* -0.192* -0.204** 
(0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
jobonlyn 0.225 0.189 0.207 0.221 
(0.142) (0.143) (0.144) (0.145) 
indum2 -0.034 -0.026 -0.005 
(0.181) (0.181) (0.183) 
indum3 0.327** 0.399*** 0.395*** 
(0.140) (0.140) (0.141) 
indum4 0.186 0.217 0.203 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.134) 
risk 0.079* 0.070* 
(0.040) (0.041) 
innovative 0.142* 0.133* 
(0.076) (0.077) 
SEnhan_lo 0.053 
(0.058) 
Constant 10.614*** 6.192*** 5.239*** 6.199*** 6.448*** 5.743*** 5.646*** 
(0.068) (1.024) (1.090) (1.118) (1.139) (1.137) (1.143) 
Observations 117 117 117 117 115 113 113
R-squared 0.059 0.266 0.298 0.346 0.400 0.449 0.454 
Adj R-squared 0.051 0.240 0.270 0.300 0.340 0.380 0.380 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Dependent variable log salary (Specification 7 in Table 5) 
Chow Test Regression 
(1) (2)
VARIABLES OLS7 Chow
gender -0.225** 0.932
(0.094) (2.271)
age_er 0.110** 0.108*
(0.044) (0.060)
age_er2 -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
educorr 0.058 0.158***
(0.044) (0.057)
lhrsrealn 0.167 0.659***
(0.135) (0.246)
founderr_dum -0.204** -0.233*
(0.098) (0.124)
jobonlyn 0.221 0.021
(0.145) (0.166)
indum2 -0.005 0.038
(0.183) (0.216)
indum3 0.395*** 0.442***
(0.141) (0.168)
indum4 0.203 0.218
(0.134) (0.165)
risk 0.070* 0.051
(0.041) (0.052)
innovative 0.133* -0.155
(0.077) (0.115)
SEnhan_lo 0.053 0.057
(0.058) (0.082)
gen_age_er -0.015 
(0.086) 
gen_age_er2 0.000 
(0.001) 
gen_educorr -0.116 
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(0.092) 
gen_lhrsrealn -0.768** 
(0.302) 
gen_founderr_dum 0.047 
(0.201) 
gen_jobonlyn 0.456 
(0.305) 
gen_indum2 -0.304 
(0.382) 
gen_indum3 -0.090 
(0.286) 
gen_indum4 0.084 
(0.266) 
gen_risk 0.046 
(0.081) 
gen_innovative 0.511*** 
(0.158) 
gen_SEnhan_lo -0.060 
(0.117) 
Constant 5.646*** 5.006***
(1.143) (1.749)
Observations 113 113
R-squared 0.454 0.582
Adj R-squared 0.380 0.460
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Chow test: F(13, 87) =  2.56; Prob > F =  0.005 
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Table 7. Estimations by gender (Specification 7 in Table 5) 
(1) (2)
VARIABLES men women
age_er 0.108* 0.093
(0.058) (0.066)
age_er2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
educorr 0.158*** 0.041
(0.055) (0.076)
lhrsrealn 0.659*** -0.109
(0.236) (0.187)
founderr_dum -0.233* -0.186
(0.118) (0.169)
jobonlyn 0.021 0.477*
(0.159) (0.272)
indum2 0.038 -0.266
(0.207) (0.336)
indum3 0.442*** 0.353
(0.161) (0.246)
indum4 0.218 0.302
(0.158) (0.222)
risk 0.051 0.097
(0.050) (0.066)
innovative -0.155 0.355***
(0.110) (0.115)
SEnhan_lo 0.057 -0.003
(0.078) (0.089)
Constant 5.006*** 5.938***
(1.677) (1.542)
Observations 67 46
R-squared 0.530 0.573
Adj R-squared 0.430 0.420
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Dependent variable job satisfaction: probit marginal effects (Specification 7 in Table 5) 
(1) (2)
VARIABLES jobsat probit1 jobsat probit2
gender 0.137* 0.168*
(0.080) (0.087)
age_er 0.071** 0.107**
(0.036) (0.048)
age_er2 -0.001* -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001)
educorr 0.045 0.046
(0.041) (0.045)
lhrsrealn -0.125 -0.031
(0.111) (0.140)
lsalarownGBP 0.018 
(0.096) 
founderr_dum 0.189** 0.208**
(0.094) (0.099)
jobonlyn 0.215 0.201
(0.136) (0.165)
indum2 -0.080 -0.158
(0.190) (0.221)
indum3 -0.054 -0.119
(0.134) (0.164)
indum4 -0.094 -0.129
(0.134) (0.150)
risk 0.028 0.045
(0.038) (0.041)
innovative 0.068 0.007
(0.070) (0.080)
SEnhan_lo 0.003 -0.021
(0.050) (0.056)
Observations 129 113
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Dependent variable job satisfaction (Specification 7 in Table 5): SUREG 
VARIABLES SUREG Separate equations
lsalary jobsat lsalary (OLS7) jobsat1 jobsat2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
gender -0.225** 0.148* -0.225** 0.125 0.150*
(0.088) (0.079) (0.094) (0.082) (0.087)
age_er 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.110** 0.073** 0.107**
(0.041) (0.037) (0.044) (0.033) (0.041)
age_er2 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
educorr 0.058 0.038 0.058 0.041 0.037
(0.041) (0.037) (0.044) (0.038) (0.040)
lhrsrealn 0.167 -0.034 0.167 -0.107 -0.036
(0.127) (0.114) (0.135) (0.097) (0.123)
lsalarownGBP 0.012 
(0.091) 
founderr_dum -0.204** 0.168** -0.204** 0.164* 0.170*
(0.092) (0.082) (0.098) (0.086) (0.090)
jobonlyn 0.221 0.177 0.221 0.177 0.174
(0.136) (0.121) (0.145) (0.116) (0.132)
indum2 -0.005 -0.115 -0.005 -0.081 -0.115
(0.171) (0.153) (0.183) (0.160) (0.165)
indum3 0.395*** -0.064 0.395*** -0.033 -0.069
(0.132) (0.118) (0.141) (0.121) (0.132)
indum4 0.203 -0.091 0.203 -0.080 -0.093
(0.125) (0.112) (0.134) (0.117) (0.122)
risk 0.070* 0.040 0.070* 0.021 0.039
(0.039) (0.035) (0.041) (0.035) (0.038)
innovative 0.133* 0.008 0.133* 0.056 0.006
(0.072) (0.065) (0.077) (0.066) (0.070)
SEnhan_lo 0.053 -0.009 0.053 0.013 -0.010
(0.054) (0.049) (0.058) (0.048) (0.052)
Constant 5.646*** -2.260** 5.646*** -1.496* -2.327**
(1.069) (0.958) (1.143) (0.830) (1.149)
Observations 113 113 113 129 113
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R-squared 0.454 0.216 0.454 0.166 0.216
Adj R-squared 0.380 0.072 0.100 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1 – Values  
Personal values are stable individual preferences, or life goals ((Bardi et al., 2009; Schwartz, 1992). Past research relates values to 
individual decisions, occupational choices and behaviours (e.g., Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2011). We measured personal 
values based on the leading theory of values by Schwartz that has been validated in research in 82 countries (Schwartz, 2012). The 
theory differentiates four general value types which can be ordered along two dimensions, the first contrasts self-interest and other-
interest values represented through self-enhancement and self-transcendence values. The second dimension focuses on whether 
individuals are inclined to take risks, proactively seek out new things, stimulation and autonomy or whether they are more chiefly 
concerned with fitting into society and abiding by societal, community and family norms. This is captured by openness to change and 
conservation values respectively. Since values theory and supporting empirical evidence specifies that the four value types (self-
enhancement, self-transcendence, openness to change and conservation) are closely correlated, Schwartz recommends only including 
a subset of values into any one regression. Thus we include the self-enhancement values in our set of explanatory variables, in order to 
capture different preferences for pay between male and female social entrepreneurs (i.e., the gender differences in the individualistic 
values). 
Values were measured using the Schwartz Value Portrait Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001; Schwartz, 2003) a well-validated and 
widely used instrument which asks respondents to react to statements such as “He/she thinks it is important that every person in the 
world be treated equally. He/she believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.” (self-transcendence value), “It is 
important to him/her to be in charge and tell others what to do. He/She wants people to do what he/she says.” (self-enhancement 
value). In consideration of questionnaire length the 21 item version of the VPQ was used, which is also used in the European Social 
Survey (Schwartz, 2003). However, as some individual value scales are known to have low reliabilities for these scales additional 
items from the 40 item version of the VPQ were used (Schwartz et al., 2001). Thus, self-transcendence was captured with 8 items 
(Cronbach’s Alpha reliability was 0.792), self-enhancement with 7 items (Cronbach’s Alpha reliability was 0.853), openness to 
change with 5 items (reliability was 0.700) and conservation with 6 items (reliability was 0.707).  
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Appendix 2 – Tables (Robustness Checks)  
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Table A5a. Dependent variable log salary: Specifications 1-6. Robustness checks with imputed salary (lsalarownGBPi1). 
Missing observations imputed by the variable mean (19 observations imputed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5 OLS6 OLS7 
gender -0.265*** -0.224** -0.220** -0.217** -0.220** -0.222** -0.206** 
(0.098) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
age_er 0.137*** 0.116*** 0.098*** 0.091** 0.093*** 0.098*** 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
age_er2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
educorr 0.090** 0.083** 0.088** 0.080** 0.049 0.041 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
lhrsrealn 0.184* 0.101 0.129 0.134 0.122 
(0.094) (0.104) (0.103) (0.101) (0.102) 
founderr_dum -0.163* -0.170* -0.193** -0.206** 
(0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
jobonlyn 0.177 0.138 0.128 0.144 
(0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) 
indum2 -0.028 -0.008 0.021 
(0.165) (0.166) (0.167) 
indum3 0.301** 0.371*** 0.377*** 
(0.126) (0.127) (0.126) 
indum4 0.186 0.230* 0.219* 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
risk 0.073** 0.063* 
(0.036) (0.037) 
innovative 0.122* 0.110 
(0.069) (0.069) 
SEnhan_lo 0.068 
(0.050) 
Constant 10.593*** 6.691*** 6.472*** 7.146*** 7.102*** 6.425*** 6.189*** 
(0.059) (0.808) (0.807) (0.822) (0.837) (0.852) (0.867) 
Observations 133 133 133 133 131 129 129
R-squared 0.053 0.245 0.268 0.313 0.367 0.411 0.420 
Adj R-squared 0.046 0.220 0.240 0.270 0.310 0.350 0.350 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5b. Dependent variable log salary: Specifications 1-6. Robustness checks with imputed salary (lsalarownGBPi3) 
Missing observations imputed by the values from the first wave of SELUSI data and the variable mean (19 observations imputed) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5 OLS6 OLS7 
gender -0.267** -0.221** -0.217** -0.218** -0.218** -0.221** -0.205** 
(0.102) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) 
age_er 0.102*** 0.082** 0.066* 0.057 0.058 0.063* 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
age_er2 -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
educorr 0.104** 0.097** 0.105** 0.093** 0.058 0.051 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
lhrsrealn 0.166 0.082 0.113 0.118 0.106 
(0.101) (0.114) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) 
founderr_dum -0.129 -0.136 -0.162* -0.175*
(0.100) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
jobonlyn 0.183 0.147 0.139 0.155 
(0.131) (0.129) (0.131) (0.131) 
indum2 0.004 0.031 0.059 
(0.178) (0.179) (0.180) 
indum3 0.395*** 0.474*** 0.479*** 
(0.135) (0.136) (0.136) 
indum4 0.248* 0.296** 0.285** 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
risk 0.082** 0.072* 
(0.039) (0.040) 
innovative 0.138* 0.127* 
(0.075) (0.075) 
SEnhan_lo 0.066 
(0.054) 
Constant 10.595*** 7.468*** 7.271*** 7.877*** 7.844*** 7.088*** 6.858*** 
(0.061) (0.868) (0.870) (0.895) (0.903) (0.918) (0.936) 
Observations 133 133 133 133 131 129 129
R-squared 0.049 0.203 0.220 0.254 0.327 0.376 0.384 
Adj R-squared 0.042 0.180 0.190 0.210 0.270 0.310 0.310 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
47 
Table A5c. Dependent variable log revenues. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5 OLS6 OLS7 
gender -0.875*** -0.834*** -0.789** -0.810*** -0.870*** -0.913*** -0.877*** 
(0.316) (0.316) (0.302) (0.298) (0.307) (0.307) (0.310) 
age_er 0.289** 0.153 0.096 0.072 0.090 0.101 
(0.116) (0.117) (0.115) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) 
age_er2 -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
educorr 0.073 0.034 0.084 0.046 -0.045 -0.060 
(0.131) (0.125) (0.128) (0.133) (0.136) (0.137) 
lhrsrealn 1.135*** 0.730** 0.840** 0.829** 0.797** 
(0.314) (0.352) (0.356) (0.355) (0.358) 
founderr_dum -0.397 -0.416 -0.434 -0.463
(0.308) (0.311) (0.314) (0.317) 
jobonlyn 0.885** 0.727* 0.748* 0.790* 
(0.406) (0.417) (0.425) (0.428) 
indum2 -0.191 -0.045 0.032 
(0.580) (0.590) (0.598) 
indum3 0.514 0.736* 0.749* 
(0.432) (0.440) (0.441) 
indum4 0.574 0.732* 0.706* 
(0.420) (0.422) (0.424) 
risk 0.233* 0.214 
(0.129) (0.131) 
innovative 0.283 0.257 
(0.239) (0.241) 
SEnhan_lo 0.146 
(0.177) 
Constant 13.475*** 6.099** 4.772* 7.064** 7.145** 5.209* 4.669 
(0.186) (2.803) (2.702) (2.731) (2.871) (2.957) (3.032) 
Observations 130 130 130 130 128 126 126
R-squared 0.056 0.107 0.192 0.251 0.275 0.313 0.317 
Adj R-squared 0.049 0.079 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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